The goal of this paper is to challenge some of tile assumptions that have been inherent in much of the research on discourse relations, especially that which has gone on in the context of text planning. The primary assumption has been that there is only one set of relations, encompassing structural, rhetorical, and intentional information. The second assumption is that these relations only operate at the clause level and above. These are best exeml)lified by Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & Tholnpson 1987), I)ut appear to some degree in ahnost all approaches to discourse.
Intentions control tile decision making of the text rather and do not necessarily appear explicitly in the structure of the text.
Evidence from the text
We begin by working bottom up fi'om what is evidenced directly ill tile text.
'l~xt has constituent structure both below the level of the clause (studied by syntacticians) and above the level of the clause (studied by those working in discourse). One kind of evidence for constituent structure above the clause level is tile pattern of pronominalization (e.g. Grosz & Sidner's (1986) attentional structure). Others include orthographic markers (e.g. indenting paragraphs) and in ton ation.
• "Relations", such ms contrast, sequence, causality exist in the text and are directly evidenced by lexical items, such as "cue words" (l~eichman 1985).
• Intentions are evidenced indirectly by the fact that language is a goal directed activity.
Discourse theories, such as RST, conflate these three kinds of information into one, as shown in the following:
We consider discourse to be a structured collection of clauses. This structure is expressed by the nesting of segments of the discourse; .... Each discourse segment has an associated purpose .... i.e. a communicative goal. Each adjacent pair of such purl)oses is related in the discourse structure by one or more discourse structure relations, [following RST] (tlovy, el. al. 1992))
This approach, while identifying three kinds of information, structural, intentional, and rhetorical, forces them to be isomorphic. Yet no justification is provided for this assumption. Moore & Pollack (1993) argue for separating different kind of relations that hold between texts by introducing different "levels" at which segments of text can be related. ~. They argue that some relations are "informational" (e.g. volitional cause) and other relations are "intentional" (e.g. evidence), and they say of one their examples: "The intentional and informational structures for this discourse are not isomorphic". One can conclude from this that at least one of these structures must non-isomorphic with the constituent structure of the discourse, although the attthors do not discuss what the exact relationship between these structures is.
Rhetorical Relations
Rhetorical relations, as they are generally defined, function to provide coherence to the text. While it is clear that information in a text is connected by relations such as sequence, purl)ose, causality, etc., it is not clear that (a) the relations are between consecutive segments of text. that are clause-sized or larger, (b) all such segments are related by a single, specific relation.
As discussed in Meteer (1993) , relations such as "causation" can appear within a clause a.s w~ll as between clauses, ms shown by the following:
(1) My flicking the switch ca.used the light to turn on.
(2) Because I flicked the switch, the light turned on Furthermore, these alternatives offer different options for what information to include. For examph~, the clause version shown in (3) allows the speaker to omit tense and agent information whereas in (4) the speaker can switch the order of the information. 
Intentions in Discourse
While it is clear that intentions play an important role in discourse, there is no evidence for a special set, of intentional relations that operate only at the discourse level. The speaker needs to keep track of intensions, for example to answer follow up questions (Moore & Paris 1989 ) and the hearer needs to recognize intentions in order to recognize the speaker's plan (e.g. Litman 1985) . But there are no requirements in either of these tasks that the intentions be isomorphic to the constituent structure of the text.
In fact, l would argue that "intentional structure" is a misnomer, but rather intentions are what control the decision making. Occasionally, there is direct evidence of these intentions in thc text, for example, in the first sentence of this paper: "The goal of this paper is...". However, for the most part, intentions are implicit; they are a function of the information being communicated, rather than a function of the structure of the text. This should not be surprising, since there are many kinds of inferences one can get from a text that is not directly reflected in its structure, and from an understanding perspective, the intentions of the speaker are just one more inference.
From a generation perspective, there needs to be an intensional model-a model of the mind of the speaker-with explicit goals, intentions, so that decisions can be made coherently. Little work is (lone on inteutionality in utterances, because few underlying programs are structured in this way. Underlying programs need to be coherent entities with goals, or there can be no notion of "intentionality".
